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Whoever takes the trouble to read the medieval canonists in their dusty folio
volumes or their unedited manuscripts cannot fail to note the frequent allusions
either to natural equity or to canonical equity. One may then begin to wonder
what connection there is between these two terms. While they are to a certain
extent used interchangeably, there is still something to be learned from consider-
ing them as referring to distinct if related concepts. A brief study of the role
these two concepts have played in the history of canon law may serve to clarify
the relation between them and at the same time to bring into relief that
"equitableness" which has always been the chief boast of the canonists for their
system. 1
After a survey of the theological and juridical milieu in which the notion of
equity first gained currency, we will consider the Decretum of Gratian and the
work of the body of canonists called "decretists" who worked principally in the
half century after Gratian and made his compilation the starting point of their
studies; next, the work of the later medieval canonists, called "decretalists" -
after the Decretalia of Gregory IX, which furnished much of their subject
matter - or simply "commentators"; and finally, the work of the postmedieval
and modern authors. We hope to shed some light on the relation between
natural equity and canonical equity, even if we cannot provide a definitive
statement of what that relation is.2
I. BACKGROUND
In the domain of equity as in many others the twelfth century canonists -
Gratian and the decretists - were influenced by several currents of thought:
the canonical tradition, the civil law tradition of the tenth and eleventh centuries,
and the Bolognese renaissance. Each of these had its own part to play in the
development of the concept of natural equity as well as that of canonical
equity. Let us consider them one by one.
The canonical tradition.3-The only area in which the canonical collections
previous to Gratian's give more than inchoate indications for our purposes is
where the collections set out the principles of interpretation. The aequitas re-
1. Cf. CHARLES LEFEBVRE, LES POUVOIRS DU JUGE EN DROIT CANONIQUE 208 (Paris,
1938).
2. One will find a considerable bibliography on equity in G. KiScH, ERASMUS UND DIE
JURISPRUDENZE SEINER ZEIT 529 ff. (Basel, 1960). For its role in canon law, see R. Bidagor,
El espiritu del derecho canonico, 13 REVISTA ESPANOLA DE DERECHO CANONICO 5-30 (1958).
3. This element has been put in the first place because the well-known tendency of Gratian
and the first decretists did not dispose them to receive the Roman influence entirely uniform-
ly. Moreover, the tendency which is manifested there is too firmly maintained against the
Roman tendency to be neglected. Cf. Charles Lefebvre, "1quit6," in 5 DICTIONNAIRE DE
DROIT CANONIQUE col. 394f.; see also L. J. RILEY, THE HISTORY, NATURE AND USE OF
EPIKEA IN MORAL THEOLOGY (Washington, 1948).
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ferred to in these texts is what the Fathers discerned either in Scripture or in
Roman law. It reveals a Christian impress. 4 We do not know the source of the
definition attributed by Hostiensis to St. Cyprian: "Equity is justice tempered
by sweet mercy" (Aequitas est iustitia dulcore misericordiae ternperata) ,5 but it
expresses accurately enough the sense in which equity was understood by the
writers of this early period. 6
Even this early, however, Honorius II (1124-1130) is setting up canonical
equity (aequitas canonum) against the strictness of the laws (districtio legum),
thus suggesting that the flexibility implied by the term "equity" is to be found
within the canonical legislation itself and, at the same time, at least implicitly
affirming that the equity of which he speaks is itself a form of law since it is ex-
pressed in some way in the canons.7
This first appearance of "canonical equity" should not be confused with
the related tendency toward benevolence and indulgence found in the same
period under the names of misericordia, dispensatio, and humanitas, although
these too are logically opposed to rigor.8 To account for the divergences which
cropped up in many canonical texts, Ivo of Chartres (d. 1097)9 and Alger of
Li6ge (d. 1131),10 especially the former, maintained that certain rules re-
flected a concern for justice, certain others a tempering due to mercy. Later,
this distinction was to play an important part, but its relevance to the concept
of equity did not at once become apparent. 1 1
The civil law tradition of the 10th and 11th centuries.-The civil law tradi-
tion prior to the Bolognese renaissance of the early twelfth century clearly empha-
sized the notion of equity, although it is not easy to discern just what influences led
it to do so.12 The Exceptiones legum rornanarum (c. 1100) prefers equity to
4. Cf. E. WOHLHAUPTER, AEQUITAS CANONICA 28, n. 1 (Paderbom, 1931).
5. Cf. G. KIScH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 44, where a plausible explanation of this attribu-
tion is given.
6. See HOSTIENSIS, SUMMA AUREA, Book V, De dispensationibus n. 1.
7. In opposing the equity of the canons to the rigor of the laws, Honorius II brings out
one characteristic of canonical legislation. At this epoch the canons were still typically rules
set out by councils.
8. Gratian and the decretists (in particular, Huguccio) did not yet assimilate equity
(aequitas )and mercy (misericordia). See in. particular GRATIAN, DECRETUM D. 45, and
the decretists thereon. Huguccio does note that equity tends toward piety and toward
mercy, but one is not yet assimilated to the other, and Huguccio himself assimilates equity
to justice.
9. The prologue of the PANORMIA is explicit on this point. Cf. Ivo, PANORMIA, 161 PAmo-
LOGIA LATINA Col. 48 (henceforth referred to as PL.). See on this point the remarks of
MARTIN GRABMAN, 1 DIE GESCHICHTE DER SCHOLASTICHEN METHODE 242 (Freiburg-im-
Brisgau, 1909-11), and also those of J. DE GHELLINCK, La MOUVEMENT THiOLOGIQUE DU
XIIe SIECLE 48ff. (Bruges, 1948).
10. ALGER, LIBER DE MISERICORDIA ET JUSTITIA, 180 PL. cols. 857-861.
11. The term "equity" is not used here. It is, moreover, necessary to emphasize that the
perspective of these authors - which will also be that of Gratian, of Peter of Blois, and of
a good many other canonists - envisions the conciliation of the many rules, so often op-
posed to each other, presented by the collections of canons. This is a point of view quite
different from that of interpretation, although it will evolve into a rule of interpretation.
12. See Charles Lefebvre, Les tendances chrtiennes dans les Ugislations germaniques
postirieures aux invasions, in MELANGES MONER 280 ff. (Paris, 1959); Cf. FR. CALASSO,
MEDIO EVO DEL DIRITTO 334f. (Milan, 1954). Doubtless Christian influence played a con-
siderable role in this civil law movement, either directly or through the laws it inspired.
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strict law.13 The Brachylogus (c. 1110) is no less definite, for it declares that
"Judgment should be given in accordance with the dictates of equity even if
they appear to contravene the written law" (Sin vero equitas juri scripto contrari
videtur, secundum ipsam judicandum est). 14 Fragment V of the Codex Haenel
is to the same effect, preferring "equitas non constituta" to "jus" and to "id
quod pro iure habetur."15 To the same effect is the Quaestiones de juris
subtilitatibus in which an aequitas distinctly Christian in nature is made to
prevail over law.16 In all these texts, it is important to note, the aequitas spoken
of is synonymous with justice; it is the supreme law and not the benevolent
concession peculiar to certain canonical texts. Nonetheless, one cannot fail to
see in these instances of equity at least a tendency toward an indulgence dictated
by humanity.
The Bolognese renaissance. I 7-The great revival of Roman law studies at
Bologna in the early twelfth century quickly led the civilians to regard their
borrowings from the Digest and the Code as essential elements of their system.
The tenor of these borrowings was somewhat ambiguous. We are able today to
distinguish between the classical conception of equity on the one hand and the
conception of equity in Justinian's law on the other. But the medieval jurist
had not yet arrived at such a distinction; he was led therefore to combine
different approaches, all of which seemed to him equally well grounded in the
sources.
What classical law emphasizes under the name of equity, as Cicero points out,
is that quest for equality "quae in paribus paria jura desiderat."l8 Thus, accent
is on an element intrinsic to the positive law and imbedded in any system of law,
an ideal of justice calling for the uniform treatment of particular cases.
In addition to this first sense of equity, however, we have another one which
arises from the praetor's Edict: equity in this sense is an element opposed to
the positive law insofar as positive law fails in certain circumstances to incor-
porate natural justice. The Edict represents an effort to give this equity pre-
cedence over the jus civile - an equity whose role it is to aid, to supplement,
and even to correct the positive law from without. 19
13. See C. G. MOR, EXcEPTIONES LEGUM ROMANARUM, 2 SCRITTI GIURIDICI PREIRNERIANI
(10 ORBIS ROMANUS) (Milan, 1938).
14. E. BOCKING, CORPUS LEGUM SIVE BRACHYLOGUS IURIS CIVILIS (Berlin, 1829).
15. H. FITTING, JURISTISCHE SCHRIFTEN 147 (Berlin, 1895).
16. Cf. G. Zanetti, Carattere canonico dell'aequitas nelia titteratura civilistica preirneriana,
26 RiVISTA DI STORIA DEL DIRITTO ITALIANO 239ff. (1953). The author qualifies this equity
as "canonical" in the title of his article. The article itself makes it clear in my opinion that
it would be preferable to call it "Christian." See p. 240 of the Zanetti article. Note that
the date of the QUAESTIONES DE JURIS SUBTILITATIBUS is disputed, and it is placed in the
mid-twelfth century by H. KANTOROWICZ, STUDIES IN THE GLOSSATORS OF THE ROMAN
LAW 189 (1938).
17. A certain systematization which already existed with the Bolognese jurists could not
help exercising an influence of the first importance on the canonical conceptions, at least in
furnishing them categories.
18. ToPICA, 4:23, A little before this he has defined the jus civile as, "aequitas constituta
iis qui eiusdem civitatis sunt" (2:9), and this seems to have furnished the first glossators
the origin of their distinction between aequitas constituta and aequitas non constituta.
19. DIGESTA 4. Cf. M. VOIGT, DAS IUS NATURALE AEQUUM ET BONUM UND JUS GENTIUM
PER ROMER (Leipzig 1856-1875) vol. I, pp. 37, 220 ff., 529f.; vol. III, pp. 267, 325f., 357f.,
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A third sense of equity, rather similar to that just mentioned, would regard
it as a benevolent interpretation of the law, an interpretation by which injustice
or excessive rigor is corrected or ameliorated, if not in the formulation of the laws,
at least in their application. Here we have Ulpian for our authority: "A judge
ought always to have his eye on equity" ("Aequitatem quoque ante oculos
habere debet judex"). 20
Justinian, influenced doubtless by Christianity but also by Hellenism, gives
even more scope to equity than did his classical predecessors. 2 1 For him, as the
Digest witnesses, equity is superior to jus, and it is toward equity that jus should
tend. Equity forms the superior ideal of justice, an ideal which transcends the
jus civile as completely as it does the jus gentium. As a consequence, the role of
aequitas as a concept set over against law - especially against the jus civile -
has with Justinian a far greater scope than in classical law, since it is rooted in
considerations of more transcendent importance. Thenceforth, decisions do not
turn primarily on apices juris or on subtilitas or jus strictum or even on jus civile,
but rather on bona fides, on justitia (&Katoo' v'), on jus aequum or equity:
"In all questions let there be observed especially justice and equity rather than
strict law" (Placuit in omnibus rebus praecipuam esse justitiae aequitatisque
quam stricti iuris rationem ).22
The Bolognese authors of the period we are considering drew on these ele-
ments without in any way distinguishing the disparate origins we have just
noted.2 3 Irnerius (insofar as we can judge him from those works which are
indisputably his own)24 tends to give precedence to Justinian's concept of
equity, 25 although he gives place as well to particular determinations drawn
from earlier Roman compilations and so based on other conceptions of equity.26
At the time of the composition of the Decretum, then, equity is for the
glossators the highest end of the law - the end toward which law aspires and
before which it bends. This conception had been felt often and variously in the
Digest. The tenth and eleventh century canonists, on the other hand, show
839f., 1113f. See also F. Pringsheim, Jus aequum et strictum, 42 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAy.-
STIFT. F. REcIITSGESCHICHTE 642f. (1921).
20. DIGESTA 13. 4:4:1.
21. It is relatively difficult to distinguish the factors which formed Justinian's approach.
Cf. S. Riccobono, Evoluiione del diritto romano, 2 MiLANOES CORNIL 27f.; C. HOHENLOHE,
ErNFLUSS DES CHRISTENSTUM AUF DAS CORPUS IURIS CIVLIS 122, 126, 130f. (Vienna,
1937).
22. This influence, derived from Christianity and manifest already with Constantine, could
only grow in the ages which followed.
23. A sense of history scarcely made an appearance before the humanists; ef. D. MAFFEI,
GLI INIZI DELL' "UMANESIMO GIURIDICO," esp. pp. 126 ff. (Milan, 1956).
24. Cf. H. KANTOROWICZ, STUDIES IN THE GLOSSATORS OF THE ROMAN LAW 131-165
(Cambridge, 1938).
25. See A. Rota, La concezione irneriana dell' aequitas, 26 RIviSTA INTERNATIONALE DI
FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO 251-257 (1948).
26. Thus in the gloss on D. 3, where he remarks: "Bonum et aequum vocat his iustitiam;
differt autem aequitas a iustitia: aequitas enim in ipsis rebus percipitur, quae, cum descendit
ex voluntate, forma accepta fit iustitia." In E. BESTA, 2 L'OPERA D'IRNERIO (Turin, 1896).
Calasso seems to draw from this text conclusions which go beyond its meaning (op. cit.
supra note 12, at 477).
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less firmness and consistency in their approach to the notion of equity; to be
sure, they too regard it as the ultimate rule of law, but they do not find occasion
to appeal to it directly except in extraordinary circumstances.
II. GRATIAN AND THE DECRETISTS
Gratian in certain passages of the Decretum has formulated a sense of the
term "equity" identical to that found in the sources of Roman law known in
his time. At one point, he declares:
When a sentence is passed contrary to the dictates of equity [quando
contra aequitatem sententia fertur], the case is the same as that of a subject
who cannot be compelled to do evil, knowing that obedience is not to be
rendered prelates in what is illicit.2 7
Here he apparently identifies equity with justice. Elsewhere he asserts:
It is in the power . . . of the Holy Roman Church to bestow her privileges
on anyone she will, and grant special graces [specialia beneficia indulgere]
outside the scope of the general laws [decreta]. Nevertheless, in doing so, she
must always give consideration to the equity of reason [considerata rationis
aequitate] so that she who is the mother of justice may never be found
in conflict with it.28
The opposition set up between "specialia beneficia indulgere" and "considerata
rationis aequitate" proves that, for Gratian as for the glossators, aequitas means
that equity which constitutes the supreme ideal of justice. In this way Gratian
harks back to Justinian's sense of aequitas. This, to be sure, is the same sense in
which equity is commonly understood by theologians. Peter Lombard, for in-
stance, generally assimilates equity to justice,29 although he admits also an equity
which tends to benevolence and mercy.3 0 But there is also in Gratian an oppo-
sition, to which he frequently alludes, between rigor and misericordia.3 1 This
represents a traditional conceptual distinction which is to be of major importance
in the development of the idea of equity.3 2
In the twelfth century the main lines of the future theory of equity are then
drawn. At any rate neither the civilians nor the canonists seem to have disagreed
on this: equity is that supreme source of justice and of law which we have
27. Dictum before c. 91, Si quis, C. XI, q. 3. Cf. C. J. Hering, Die aequitas bei Gratian,
10 STUDIA GRATIANA 97-113 (1957).
28. Dictum, sec. 4 after c. 16, IDEO, C. XXV, q. 1. This expression rationis aequitas will
be taken up by the decretists, and again by Huguccio, to designate natural equity.
29. Cf. Charles Lefebvre, La notion d'Jquitd chez Pierre Lombard, in MISCELLANEA LoM-
BARDIANA 223ff. (Novara, 1954); see also 0. LOTTIN, 3 PSYCHOLOGIE ET MORALE AUX
XIIe ET XIIIe SI5CLES 360ff. (Paris, 1956).
30. Cf. Lefebvre, op. cit. supra note 29, at 234ff.
31. DECRETUM, D. 45: 4f., 8ff., 14, 16.
32. One may remark the reasons for this distinction: the necessity of reconciling canons set
out in different senses; see supra note 11. This rule of concordance will later become a rule
for interpretation. If its meaning is to be understood, its origin should not be forgotten.
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seen* celebrated in earlier writings. 3 3 There is no such harmony of opinion as
regards the relations between equity and positive law. On this point early tradi-
tion was to have great importance for at least one school of civilians, who in
their turn came to influence certain of the canonists. 34
The Roman texts which give precedence now to the letter of the written law,
now to equity, are variously interpreted. According to Bulgarus (fl. 1160), his
students Rogerius (c. 1160) and Joannes Bassianus (c. 1180), and after them
Azo (c. 1210) and Accursius (d. 1263), only written equity is to be given pref-
erence in the case of opposition to the letter of a law. On the other hand, Martinus
Gosia (fl. 1158), followed by Jacobus (d. 1178), Hugolinus (fl. 1158), and
Placentinus (fl. 1175), judges that equity in general should prevail in case of op-
position to any kind of written law - is it not the fount and origin of justice
(justitiae fons et origo)? And Martinus proved his point by referring to "God,
who, according to His desire, is called equity, for equity is no other than God." 3 5
This broad notion of equity, however, soon fell victim to the dominant influence
of Azo, Accursius, and the Gloss.36
Since it was written equity, then, that became the dominant conception, the
antithesis noted in the Roman texts between jus strictum or subtilitas on the one
hand, and aequitas on the other, became influential in the definition of equity,
and ultimately impressed on that definition the idea of a certain tendency op-
posed to rigor and conducive to leniency and benevolence.
The decretists were not unaffected by this evolution in the thinking of the
civilians. In the earliest decretists, what dominates is most probably the tendency
favorable to equity and traditional in milieus not yet influenced by Roman law.
The summas, Quoniam status and Cum in tres partes, are clear enough in this
regard: "A question of law is to be determined by written law, by equity, and
by analogy. If equity appears contrary to the written law, judgment is to be given
according to equity." 37
Stephen of Tournai (c. 1160), the pupil of the civilian Bulgarus, is not, how-
ever, of such a mind. He relies on the distinction set up by his master, in which
33. E. M. Meijers, Le conflit entre l'Fquiti et la loi chez les glossateurs, 17 TiJDSCHRIFT
VOOR RC 117f. (1940); cf. A. Rota, La concezione irneriana dell' aequitas, 26 RIVISTA IN-
TERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO 24-25 (1948); the interpretation affirmed by
CALASSO, Op. cit. supra note 12, at 474 is to be understood, it seems to me, taking account
of the other glosses of Irnerius (cf. LEFEBVRE, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 172f.).
34. As to the origins of the tendency followed by this school led by Martinus Gosia, see
Lefebvre, loc. cit. supra note 12, at 280ff. The civilians disputed the place to give equity in
interpretation. With the canonists the origin of the conflict between equity and positive
law centers in the role to be given in the principles of interpretation to the Roman law,
which leaves less to equity than the canonical principles.
35. See H. FITTING, Op. cit. supra note 15, at 216.
36. For further development, see E. M. Meijers, op. cit. supra note 33, at 122; also M.
Boulet-Sautel, Aquiti, justice et droit chez les glossateurs du XIIe si~cle, in RECUEIL DES
MIEMOmES ET TRAVAUX PUBLIES PAR LA SOCIiT D'HISTOIRE DU DROIT ET DES INSTITUTIONS
DES ANCIENS PAYS DE DROIT ECRIT, Universit6 de Montpellier 1-2.
37. Biblioth~que nationale [hereafter B.N.] mss. lat., 16538, f. 22 v; WW 16540, f. 19 v.
These sumnas probably go back to the years 1160-1171.
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equity prevails only when -it is written. Nor is it surprising that he goes on also
to revive the opposition between "rigor" and "aequitas."3 8
'Sicard of Cremona (c. 1179) shows evidence of having retained the idea of
equity in its general sense. At the same time he notes that a law may be extended
to coVer a case not strictly within its terms unless it is too rigorous, or unless some
reasohi, or some consideration of time or place, gives ground for equitably re-
stricting it. 3 9
The greatest of the decretists, Huguccio (c. 1187), places clear emphasis on
equity's character of indulgence. Doubtless he occasionally assimilates equity to
law,4 0 but he insists that natural equity "moves to justice and mercy" (justitiam et
pietatem suadet) .41 Moreover, though his formation in the Roman law would seem
to enroll him in the school of Bulgarus - for whom, as we have seen, only written
equity may prevail over written law - Huguccio himself does not hesitate to give
a more general precedence to equity. This seems to be the purport of his state-
rntent that "Judgment must be given according to law unless something stands in
the way," 4 2 a statement made without allusion to the conflict between the fol-
lowers of Bulgarus and those of Gosia on whether the "something" must be
written or not. Elsewhere, -he does suggest a certain role for equity as an inter-
ptetive principle embodied Within the law of the Church, making clear that one
must always safeguard "canonica aequitas."43
In general, then, if the early civilians seem to hesitate in choosing a path to
follow, the decretists are at first clearly favorable to the idea of an equity of
indulgence to which they assign a pre-eminence over the strict law. But Huguccio,
even while he accepts Justinian's definition of equity, is careful to point also the
existence of a "canonica aequitas," of a legislation, in short, in which equity of a
merciful and indulgent stamp has a position of prime importance within the law,
rather than above it.
III. THE DECRETALS AND THE DECRETALISTS
In fact, as Huguccio had implied, the papal legislation which was to make up
the body of later canon laws had already clearly emphasized that the canons are
inspired by natural equity and are in their equitable effects to be contrasted with
the rigor of the civil laws.4 4
38. "F. V. SCHULTE, DIE SUMMA DES STEPHANUS TORNACENsIs 4; 103f. (1891). Simon
of Bisignano (c. 1179) adds nothing to the subject. See B.N. mss. lat. 3934, f. 59 s.
39. SICARDUS, SUMMA, Vatican [hereafter B.V.] Pal. lat. 653, f. 66 v; f. 78 v; f. 67 r.
40. HUGuccIo, SUMMA, B.V lat. 2280, ad. dist. 50, c. 25.
4l'; Ibid., B.N. mss. lat. 3891; f. 214 v.
42. Id. at f. 59 v.
43. Ibid., B.V. lat. 2280, f. 9 v; f. 10 r; f. 16 r: Huguccio says that it is necessary not
to depart from canonica aequitas or canonica ratio, using the terms interchangeably. The
assimilation of aequitas to ratio thus remains an essential point, without his putting in doubt
that aequitas inclines toward piety or mercy. Perhaps one must see in this an effect of the
teaching on justice admitted by Peter Lombard, whose definition is taken from St. Augustine
(cf. LOTTIN, op. cit. supra note 29, at 283ff.): "Justitia est in subveniendo miseris."
Misericordia is thus to be understood as related to justice.
44. It is, however, necessary to be careful in interpreting the meaning of the term jus
naturale in this epoch. See, in particular, Sicard of Cremona: ". . . Per iniquitatem dictum
'1°28
CHARLES LEFEBVRE
In the early twelfth century, Honorius II, speaking of the. requirements ir the
action initiated by the so-called oath of. calumny, had already emphasized that
"aequitas canonum" is opposed to the "districtio legum." 4 5 The tradition was fol-
lowed by Alexander III (1164-1181) in several answers incorporated into the
Decretals. The emphasis is 'on canonical procedure's freedom from rigid t.ech-
nicality. 46 It is in the same spirit that Innocent IJI (1.198-1216) instituted the
broad matrimonial inquest for the discovery of impediments to marriage and
liberalized the admission of witnesses in proceedings involving simony. In the
latter case, where, as he stresses, civil removal (not .criminal punishment) of a
simoniac is at issue, witnesses may be heard, though guilty themselves of other
crimes: they are admitted "not by rigor of law, but in equitable moderation"
(non secundum rigorem iuris, sed secundum ternperantiam aequitatis).47
The reason generally given for the latitude afforded by canon law in such
procedural reforms is in its aim to avoid punctiliousness and the multiplication
of obsolete formalities which impede the discovery of the truth or the vindication
of the rights of the parties. The canon law also developed peculiar institutions
such as dispensation, dissimulation, and tolerance, calculated to give the spiritual
and individual interests of the faithful the pre-eminence over certain considera-
tions of ecclesiastical organization. 4 8 Finally, we have Honorius III's (1216-1227)
determination in what became the decretal Ex parte that in a case not covered
by legislation the dictates of equity are to be followed, taking the path most
humane and tending to indulgence. 48 a
In this emphasis on reducing formality, eliminating administrative obstacles,
and inclining toward "indulgence," the canon law made "natural equity" its
lodestar. The tie between natural law and canon law is found in this orientation.
In a greater degree than other positive law, canon law claims to be founded
on natural law, and the latter is the source of canonica aequitas. It is this alleged
relationship to natural law which is the distant source of the opposition often ex-
hibited by canon law to civil law. In at least one area the canon law consciously
contrasted itself with the civil law. It is an area where the danger of sin was in-
est: hoc est meum, illud tuum, ut tii.q.i.c.ii., resp.: ius humanum dicit iniquitatem quia
contrarium est naturali equitati secundum quod intelligi potest: Facite vobis amicos de
mammona iniquitatis, i. de divitiis que iniquitate iuris humani acquiruntur et acquisite
possidentur." (B.V. Pal. lat. 653f, 66v)
45. DECRETALES, CORPUS JURIS CANONICI [hereafter referred to as X] 2:7 : 2.
46. E.g., X 2:1:6 (Civil action not invalidated by wrong name being affixed to the libel);
X 1:20:2 (Discretion delegated to bishop to determine seriousness of physical defect in
candidate for ecclesiastical promotion).
47. X 5:3:32. See X 4:1:27 for the matrimonial inquest.
48. Cf. J. BRYS, DE DISPENSATIONE IN IURE CANONICO (Bruges, 1925); Charles Lefebvre,
"Dissimulation," in 4 DICT. DR DROIT CAN. cols. 1296ff. (1949); G. OLIVERO, DISSIMULATIO
o TOLERANTIA NELL' ORDINAMENTO CANONICO 179ff. (Milan, 1953).
It should be noted, however, that at times there is a greater rigor in the canon law
with the claimed intention of avoiding sin. For example, the canon law demands good faith
throughout the duration of the period of prescription. Cf. N. Vilain, Prescription et Bonne
Foi du D4cret de Gratian a lean d'Andrd, 14 TRADITIO 179ff. (1958). On the general
effect on the canon law of this concern with sin, one should consult the works of P. Fedele.
In particular, his DiScORSO GENERALE SULL'ORDINAMENTO CANONICO. (Padua, 1941) is
valuable, despite the reservations which must be made on some of his conclusions, especially
on the public character of canon law.
48a. X 1:36:11.
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volved, and the canon law attempted to avoid periculum animae. Thus, the canon
law demanded a higher standard of good faith in prescription; it demanded the
restitution of usury; and it upheld agreements made without consideration. There
is a second area, where the distinction was not so self-conscious, but there was still
antagonism. It was the area of cases where the civil law seemed to prefer insti-
tutional necessities to the right of particular persons, while the canon law at-
tempted to assure these rights of persons in a strict fashion.49
The decretalists had, then, in the body of legislation that formed their subject
matter all the elements they needed for formulating a theory of equity. The ele-
ments are, indeed, presented by the commentators without controversy. It was
less simple to determine how equity applied in a particular case.
The theory adopted by the canonists included certain civil law elements which
canonical tradition had handed down to them. Like Justinian's equity, the equity
celebrated in certain canonical texts is the supreme ideal toward which the law,
properly subordinated, must tend. It is thus to be contrasted with the positive law,
and is marked by special characteristics of humanity, benevolence, and mercy.
These are the points we have seen emphasized in the writings of Huguccio. None-
theless, canonical equity is not to be confused with the "cerebral" equity at-
tributed by the civilians to Martinus Gosia, a type of equity they considered too
apt to prefer solutions dictated by the judge's own vague notions of what was
equitable to those solutions worked out by the lawgiver in the formulation of his
mandates. Canonical doctrine adhered to the principles which carried the day
among the civilians and recognized that equity may not be invoked in direct con-
flict with written law. It is for this reason equity is said to be informata a jure,
to be based, that is, on principles clearly formulated in legislation. 5 0 Obviously
the law which is to inform equity in this manner cannot be Roman law, not at
least when the rigorous character of Roman law brings it and canon law into
conflict.
A difficulty then arises as to what role to assign to Roman law in the interpre-
tation of the canons, or in the solution of cases not provided for in canonical
legislation. Some incline to give Roman law a very extensive scope in filling the
interstices of the canons, whereas others prefer to rely on general principles ema-
nating from the canon law itself, or on Roman law in a form attenuated and
modified by canonical principles. Hostiensis allied himself with the latter approach
in his frequent sharp criticisms of Innocent IV for depending too much on Roman
law in his interpretations and too little on canonical inspiration or influence.51
William Durandus (c. 1250), a follower of Hostiensis, took the same position as
his master,52 and even the great Johannes Andreae (1270-1348) followed suit, at
49. The points on which there is a divergence between canon law and civil law constitute
the subject of an entire literature. Cf. J. PORTEMER, RECHERCHES SUR LES "DIFFERENTIAE
IURIS CIVILIS ET CANONICI" (Paris, 1946).
50. On the legal source of equity, the Glossa ordinaria on X 1: 36: 11 is explicit. Cf. A.
REiFFENSTUEL, IUS CANONICUM UNIVERSuM, bk. 1, title 2, n. 416 (Paris, 1840), where a
r6sum of the traditional doctrine may be found.
51. Compare INNOCENT IV, COMMENTARIA IN QUINQUE DECRETALIUM LIBROS, on
X 1:23:7 at the word "ardua" with Hostiensis in many passages of his LECTURA. See also
Charles Lefebvre, "Sinibalde de Fieschi," in 7 DICTIONNAIRE DR DROIT CANONIQUE col. 840f.
52. DuRANDus, SPECULUM IURIS bk. 1, pt. 1, de dispensatione (Venice, 1598).
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least in certain cases. 53 The later leading canonist Panormitanus (d. 1445) was
also among those who followed this line of thinking.
54
To be sure, the reality of this divergence has been challenged. 5 5 It would,
perhaps, not be accurate to see at work here two schools opposed to one another
as the followers of Bulgarus were opposed to those of Gosia. Nevertheless, it seems
clear that there were two countervailing tendencies. Innocent IV himself gives
evidence of such a division when he speaks of the tendency of certain canonists
to turn unnecessarily to Roman law in cases where the principles of the canon
law would have furnished appropriate solutions.5 6
These old distinctions are also pursued by later commentators. Thus Dinus
Mugellanus (fl. 1300), the glossator if not the author of the rules of the Sext,
points out that where a general rule of aequitas scripta and a particular rule or
rigor scriptus apply in terms to the same case, familiar principles require that
the latter prevail. 5 7 In contrast, John of Lignano (d. 1383) supposes a case which
is not directly covered by any rule, but presents persuasive analogies with one
case covered by aequitas scripta and with another case covered by rigor scriptus.
He gives the preference to the equitable analogue.5 8
It is in those cases that may be dealt with along equitable lines that equity
is most often done. To be sure, it is only in the Conclusiones Novae (1376-1446)
and in the work of Gilles Bellemtre (d. 1407) that decisions specifically appealing
to equity are to be found. 59 But equity is by no means absent from other decisions.
Moreover, the majority of the cases presented in the papal curia hardly allowed
for the intervention of equity; most of them concerned either benefices or
rescripts - administrative matters to be dealt with along lines clearly laid down,
and allowing no place for unforeseen situations.
In the course of time - especially from the end of the thirteenth century
on - the theory of ratio legis encroaches more and more on the domain of equity.
That is to say, an increasing reliance on the intent of the legislator makes it appear
unnecessary to resort to a higher source of law.60 We must admit a certain con-
venience in such a substitution. The higher source of law as contrasted with the
53. Especially Commentarium on X I.: 35: 1.
54. Commentarium on X 2:1:14 n. 32, where he takes a very clear position on the subject
of the place of equity in judgments.
55. Stephan Kuttner, Methodological Problems concerning the History of Canon Law, 30
SPECULUM 542 (1955).
56. On X 1:23:7, criticizing the use made by certain canonists of the Roman concept de-
fensor civitatis.
57. COMMENTARIUM IN REGULAS IURIS PONTIFICH, on reg. 2, Possessor, n. 23; on reg.
Aequitas, n. 8 (Lyons, 1563). JOHN GAUFREDI, COLLECTORIUM (on 1:36:2) attributes to
Dinus a position which makes equity prevail, and yet Dinus says expressly: "praefertur rigor,
quia in iure generi per speciem derogatur."
58. B. V. CHis. E VIII 241, f. 90 v: ". . . licet haec aequitas non scripta, tamen similis
aequitas est scripta . . . in simili casu novo tunc bene praefertur simile aequitatis simili
rigoris."
59. P. REBUFF, DECISIONES ROTAE NOVAE (Lyons, 1555), f. 108, c. 2, dec. I. De rerum
per mutatione, the chapter of the Clementines where equity intervenes and G. BELLEMERE,
DEcISIONEs cANONICAE (Venice, 1613) dd. 52 f., reporting fourteenth century decisions on
the same chapter of Clementines.
60. Cf. CHARLES LEFEBVRE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 101ff., where the development of the
theory of the ratio legis is traced together with the consequences which flow from it in the
interpretation of the canonical rules.
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sources of written legislation speaks all too often with so uncertain a voice as to
leave the way open to arbitrary decisions.
The Roman conception of aequitas was not the only version of equity to gain
curtency during the Middle Ages. In the middle of the thirteenth century the
influence of Aristotle is felt. Aristotle saw in Trr~etKeta (which was translated as
aequitas) two pointg to emphasize:
1) Law must include an element that does not conform to written legal
rules, but rather serves to correct them. Law must give effect to a governing prin-
ciple whereby a general rule of positive law may be amended in its application,
since it applies in terms to situations the legislator cannot have meant it to cover
unless he meant to be unjust.
2) The equitable man, grteiKe'q, is characterized by humanity and in-
dulgence, of which his actions give evidence. 6 1
'The second of these points raises no difficulties. The first point, however,
presents some ambiguity. The Roman law, had dealt with the same problem
by appealing not to a superior principle of justice but simply to the intention of
the legislator, who cannot be supposed to have wished the law to be observed
in extreme cases. Thus the celebrated law Non dubium had made clear that
"There is no doubt that one violates the law when he adheres to its literal
language contrary to its intention" [Non dubium est in legem committere eum
qui verba legis amplexus contra legis nititur voluntatem].62 The classic example
of such a case supposes a law which orders that the gates of a city be barred
at the approach of an enemy and asks, Are the guards to follow this law even if
it means excluding a number of citizens who have not had time to take refuge
in the city? 6 3
In exactly 'the same spirit, the Glossa ordinaria of Johannes Teutonicus (c.
1215) speaks of not departing from the letter of the law "unless the letter gives
rise to a distorted unlerstanding."64 In another place it declares, "It is enough
that one comply with the intention [mentem] of a rescript, even if he acts con-
trary to the letter." 65 The Gloss also says more broadly: "General terms do not
extend to cases that have not been spoken of or thought of." 6 6
Conceptions of this kind, as they are recognized both in the Roman law and
in the canon law, differ considerably from the approach of Aristotle and of St.
Thomas to the same subject.6 7 For these thinkers, epikeia, or equity, derives its
authority not from a supposed intention of the legislator, but from an inherent
limitation of positive law: positive law has no binding force in a case where its
application would be contrary to the common good or to the natural law. Positive
61. See G. KiscH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 18ff.
62: CODEX JUSTINIANI 1.'14:5. The canonists comment on this at c. Intelligentia, X
5:40:6.
63. See also THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIcA I-I1, 96:6. Baldus gives another
example of the same kind. Cf. Charles Lefebvre, "Epikie," in 5 DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT
CANONIQUE col. 368.
64. Gloss at the word "sententias," D. 38:12. He says, "nisi ex verbis pravus" geiteratur
intellectus."
65. Gloss at the words "Sed spiritualiter," D. 2:3:104.
66. Gloss at the wordg "Is autem," D. 22:2:4.
67. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, ch. 10, 1137b.
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law by its very nature can have no real existence if it. is unjust. The canon law,
in certain texts, adopts this position. 68
Yet this position does not seem to be a popular one among the medieval
canonists. 6 9 Even when we come to the works of Guido de Baysio (c. 1300) or
the Collectarium - works unquestionably influenced by St. Thomas - we find
no evidence of epikeia, at least in the Aristotelian sense. 70 Both authorities con-
tent themselves with restating the traditional conception of equity, and using it
to elucidate the law Non dubium. When the Aristotelian notion of epikeia is
taken up again it is in the fourteenth century theological treatises called the
summae confessorum, especially the Summa astesana (1317) and those that fol-
low it.71 These works tend to be outside the purview of the canonists, who con-
tinue to confine themselves to interpretations of the law Non dubium.
This restraint on the part of the canonists is understandable enough. There
is after all no need to have recourse to a supervening principle of justice except
where the rules of the positive law cannot be brought by ordinary processes of
interpretation to yield just results. Within the framework of the medieval canon
law, the development of ratio legis as a principle of interpretation apparently
provided a satisfactory way of solving such problems .as arose without resort to
any supervening principle.
IV. POST-MEDIEvAL DEVELOPMENT
1. The Influence of Suarez. - It is under the influence of sixteenth century
moral theologians that the conception of equity is further developed. As we
have seen, it had been understood by the majority of authorities that only
written equity could prevail over the positive law. The supervening principle
of justice had been further limited by the development of ratio legis. But now
the more rigorous study of sources characteristic of the new school of civilians
indicated that the old distinction between aequitas - whether written or un-
written - and rigor rested on an inaccurate reading of the texts. 72 These dis,
tinctions, therefore, were promptly dropped from the vocabulary of the civilians
with the expectation that the canonists would .shortly follow suit. Civilians
thereafter kept strictly to the two doctrines of ratio legis and epikeia.. The cor-
rection of an unjust law required by epikeia was conceived of as doing no more
than allowing for the moderation or amendment of a law under certain cir-
cumstances to conform to the intention of the legislator, who is deemed to be
inspired by that equity, benevolence, or indulgence so often recommended by
the written law.7 3
68. DECRETUM, D. 8:2 and the preceding dictum. An application is found in INNOCENT
IV, op. cit. supra note 51, with a good many precisions, on X 3:49:8. The later commen'ta-
tors on this chapter take up the doctrine of Innocent.
69. The term "epikeia" is first not found at all in this sense. The later case of the law
Non dubium does not correspond exactly to the conception of Aristotle.
70. See both Guido's Rosarium Decreti, and his famous Commentary on the Sext, and
note the Collectarium on X 1: 36: 2 where normally an allusion ought to have been made.
71. ASTESANUS, SUMMA ASTESENA (Lyons, 1586) at the word "epikeia"; the Summae
confessorum sometimes treats this case- under the word "lex."
72. LEFEBVRE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 196ff.
73. See H. DONEAU, 'COMMENTARIUM IN IUS CIVILE, bk. 1, c. 13, nn. 6, llff. (Florence,
1847).
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The canonists, however, took a more complex approach to the subject in
order to incorporate the new doctrinal formulations introduced by Suarez. The
problem to which Suarez had addressed himself was whether epikeia is to be
regarded as one of those principles of natural law which prevail over incon-
sistent provisions of positive law - and, therefore, as distinct from any principle
of restrictive interpretation by which the application of a provision of positive
law is intrinsically limited. Suarez, in answering this question affirmatively, de-
veloped a precise theory of epikeia, and one so different from the understanding
of equity which had by then prevailed among the canonists that the upshot is
the development of a rather sharp distinction between epikeia and equity despite
the similarities exhibited by the two concepts.
Suarez's position enlarged the scope of epikeia as conceived by Aristotle
and St. Thomas. He began by setting up summarily the distinction between
epikeia and interpretation; interpretation aims only at showing what cases are
clearly within the ambit of a given law, whereas epikeia serves to exclude from
that ambit certain types of cases otherwise within it. Suarez detailed the cases
so excluded under three heads:
1) Cases to which the legislator had not power to extend the law in question,
as to do so would be unjust. This is the situation Aristotle and St. Thomas
had in mind, and that envisaged by one of the traditional versions of
equity.
2) Cases to which we assume that the legislator did not intend the law in
question to apply, as its application would work too great a hardship.
3) Cases in which, given the circumstances surrounding the enactment of
the law in question, it is reasonable to suppose that the legislator would
have been willing as a matter of benevolence to make an exception to
the law.74
Epikeia as thus understood covers not only the extraordinary cases envisaged
by the law Non dubium or by the traditional theory of equity, but also certain
cases previously dealt with under some of the broader conceptions of equity or
under the doctrine of excusing causes.
How was this new doctrine received among the canonists? Obviously, it had
much to recommend it - its clarity, its logical force, its benevolent inspiration.
It quickly assumed a prominent place among the recognized principles of in-
terpretation, and soon became itself the object of a process of interpretation.
Some commentators refused to distinguish Suarez's version of epikeia from
the principle of restrictive interpretation. 75 Similarly, other commentators in-
sisted that it was neither a dispensation nor a license, but a benevolent inter-
pretation of the intention of the legislator. Yet Suarez's version is not an inter-
pretation in the strict sense of the word. Although it purports to say what the
74. DE LEGIBUS, bk. 6, c. 6, a. See my article on "Epikeia," op. cit. supra note 63, at col.
369.
75. F. SCHMALZGRUEBER, JUS ECCLESIASTIcUM UNIVERSUM, bk. 1, title 2, n. 49 (Dilingen,
1717) ; G. PICHLER, SUMMA IURISPRUDENTIAE, bk. 1, title 2, n. 76; F. SCHMIER, I IURIS-
PRUDENTIA CANONICO-CIVILIS -28, n. 86 (Salzburg, 1761), without speaking of the decisions
of the Rota. (RECENTIORES, XI, d. 357.)
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legislator intended, it makes its determination on the basis of considerations
extrinsic to his intention as objectively manifested. 76
On the other hand, an increasing number of commentators were impressed
with the exceptional character of epikeia, and sought to find in it an element
whereby it might be distinguished from cases excusing observance of the law. 77 In
this way, they left it an extremely restricted field of operation - so restricted, in
fact, that it seemed to lose all relevance in the external forum.78
Equity in some sense continued to be involved in decisions of canon law. A
number of rules, continued in force from an earlier period, made express provision
for the intervention of equity whenever the occasion demanded. An example is
furnished by the commissions whereby causes are committed to tribunals with the
term "arbitrio" (i.e., with decision committed to the judge's discretion) ;79
others are to be found in the decisions of the Congregation of the Council. 8 0
Furthermore, there are a number of matters in which equity was habitually
taken into consideration - interpretation of statutes, rescripts, and exceptions;
cases of inheritances and contracts requiring good faith; dowries; cases pending
before commercial courts; cases in which neighbors or relatives intervened; arbi-
tration cases; and summary processes.S1 In addition, equity played a large role
in other cases when there was a doubtful interpretation to be made, when the
judge intervened ex officio or his authority was invoked, or when the bad
faith of a party was in issue.8 2 In all these cases, it was equity "informed by
law" - informata a jure - that was involved.8 3
In short, despite the reaction to Suarez's doctrine of equity, which ultimately
served to limit its application to exceptional cases, equity continued to play an
important role. Canonical equity remained a significant characteristic of the
system of canon law.
2. The New Code.- In this area, as in many others, the Code of Canon
Law issued in 1918 did no more than assemble and elucidate the principles
supported by the strongest elements in the existing tradition. Equity, as distin-
guished from epikeia, made a number of scattered appearances in the Code.
At the same time, it now received little or no attention from contemporary moral
theologians, who came to regard it as a concept pertaining exclusively to the
canon law.8 4
76. Cf. BENEDICT XIV, DR SYNODO DIOCESANA, bk. 12, c. 8.
77. P. LAYMAN, THEOLOGIA MORALIS, bk. 1, tract 4, c. 19, n. 1 (Munich, 1625); A.
REIFFENSTUEL, op. cit. supra note 50, at n. 378; L. FERRARIS, PROMPTA BIBLIOTHECA, at
Lex 5, n. 42 (Paris, 1833); I. D'ANNIBALE, 1 SUMMULA THEOLOGIAE MORALIS, I (Rome,
1883), no. 187, note 49; H. FEY., DE LEOIBUS 183, n. 192 (Louvain, 1887).
78. F. X. WERNZ, Jus DECRETALIUM, n. 117, n. 136 (Prati, 1899); A. VERMEERSCH,
QUAESTIONES DE IUSTITIA 400f.; B. OJETTI, SYNOPSIS at Epikeia (Rome, 1912).
79. E. WOHLRAUPTER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 129-137; cf. MARCHESANi DE COMMiS-
SIONIBUS (Rome, 1615).
80. The collection, THESAURUS RESOLUTIONUM S. CONG. CONCILI1 (Rome, 1718-1907),
furnishes many examples.
81. Cf. H. BONACOSSA, TRACTATUS DE AEQUITATE CANONICA (Venice, 1575); J. CAL-
VINUS, DE AEQUITATE LIBRI III (Milan, 1676).
82. I. D'ANNIBALE, op. cit. supra note 77, at c., n. 187.
83. A. REIFFENSTUEL, op. cit. supra note 50, at n. 416.
84. E.g., L. FANFANi, THEOLOGIA MORALIS (Rome, 1949.), where no mention is made of
aequitas as corresponding to epikeia.
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Equity, as the modern canonists conceive of it, is simply the equivalent of
justice itself insofar as justice relates to a particular case. Equity means also
that equality or universality of application which is an essential of justice. An
essential of the ideal of natural justice, equity may also emanate from a positive
human law, either civil or canonical. There is, then, both a natural equity,
coinciding with what is naturally just, and a civil or canonical equity based
on civil or canon law. The essential role of equity thus understood is the miti-
gation of a rule of positive law which proves too rigorous in its application to
a given case. Is it not then the incarnation of a human longing for more
justice?8 5
Whether the word "equity" is used alone 86 or in conjunction with "nat-
ural"87 or "canonical," 8 8 it must be read always as implying an effort to insure
a correspondence between natural and legal justice. As in ancient law, this
equity is "informed by law" (a jure informata); it does not emerge from the
blind aspirations of the faithful, but is based on an outlook informed by the
sum total of canonically formulated principles. It is in this sense that equity is
properly called "canonical."
The Code begins by recalling the whole body of rules which, though not
set forth expressly in the new canons, are still valid; among these are to be
found the principles of natural justice, natural law, or natural equity. (Canon 6:6)
From this reference we may conclude that the prime norm of canonical equity
is precisely its conformity with natural equity.
Canonical equity, however, differs from natural equity in that it develops
the various tendencies of which natural equity is the source. Thus, while natural
equity is universal and unchanging, canonical equity furnishes the guiding princi-
ples for the different configurations in which canon law conforms to different
times and places. There cannot be a total assimilation of canonical equity to
natural equity.
Equity simpliciter, the term used with no qualifying adjective, is used among
the canonists to designate canonical equity. As we have already seen, such
equity is not allowed to intervene unless it is "informed by law" (informata a
jure).
These two notions of canonical equity and natural equity are not opposed,
as at first glance they might seem to be; they are complementary. Canonical
equity is believed by canonists to develop more surely than any other type of
legislation the principles of natural equity and their application. And what
would canonical equity be without natural equity? Is not the latter the source
and foundation of all canonical legislation? While natural equity and canonical
equity cannot be identified, they are yet almost indissolubly bound together.
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85. See U. STUTS, DER GEIST DES CORPUS IURIS CANONICI (Stuttgart, 1918); A. HAGEN,
PRINZIPIEN DES KATHOLISCHEN KIRCHENRECHTS (Wiirzburg, 1949).
86. CODEX JURIS CANONICI, Canons 1455:2, 1833:2.
87. Id. at Canons 144; 192:3; 643:2.
88. Id. at Canon 20.
